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THE ROBERTA MITCHELL LECTURE:∗ STRUCTURING 
RESPONSIBILITY IN SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been my pleasure and honor to present the first Roberta Mitchell 
Lecture, and to have done so in connection with this symposium on the 
mortgage-foreclosure crisis.  Although this article (based on that lecture) 
does not address mortgage foreclosure per se, it provides a context in 
which the crisis can be better understood. 
Any discussion of the mortgage-foreclosure crisis must begin with 
securitization.  Securitization facilitates mortgage lending by enabling 
lenders to easily monetize existing mortgage loans, thereby generating cash 
to make new loans.1  Many believe, however, that the originate-to-
distribute model of securitization—enabling lenders to sell off their loans 
as they are made—caused mortgage lenders to relax their lending 
standards, leading to the multitude of risky subprime loans that now 
constitute a huge portion of the foreclosures.2 
In other contexts, I have argued that the originate-to-distribute model 
of securitization was not the primary culprit.  There was significant 
government pressure on mortgage lenders to make and securitize subprime 
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1 See, e.g., Stephen M. Juris, Scandal: Subprime Meltdown, Securitization Accounting, 
237 N.Y. L.J. 4 (2007); FRANK J. FABOZZI & VINOD KOTHARI, INTRODUCTION TO 
SECURITIZATION 3–11 (2008) (explaining that securitization is a vehicle for capital 
formation). 
2 See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime 
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV.1257, 1257–1311 (2009). 
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mortgage loans to expand homeownership.3  The fall in lending standards 
may also reflect distortions caused by the liquidity glut of that time, in 
which lenders competed aggressively for business.4  Or, it may reflect 
conflicts of interest between lending firms and their employees in charge 
of setting lending standards, such as paying employees for booking loans 
regardless of the loans’ long-term performance.5 
Blaming the originate-to-distribute model also does not explain why 
lending standards were not similarly lowered for non-mortgage securitized 
loans.  Nor does it explain why institutional investors—those who took the 
bottom-line risk on the value of the mortgage loans—did not govern their 
investments by the same strict lending standards they would observe but 
for the separation of origination and ownership. 
Regardless of what caused mortgage lending standards to fall, there is 
no question that securitization increased the number of mortgage loans—
and thus the number of subprime mortgage loans—that could be (and in 
fact were) made.  This article begins by explaining securitization as well as 
the parties in securitization transactions.  In that context, it explores a 
conundrum that I call the “protection gap.” 
II. THE PROTECTION GAP 
A. Positing the Protection Gap 
In complex securitization transactions, there is the following 
significant protection gap: When entering into a transaction, parties may be 
unable or unwilling to pay the price for full protection.6  As a result, 
transaction parties may choose or are forced to assume the good faith of 
the other parties to the transaction and the consistency and completeness of 
protections provided in the transaction documents.  When things go wrong, 
fingers are pointed at alleged wrongdoers, especially those with deep 
pockets.   
                                                                                                                          
3 See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, The Lost Cause: The Failure of the Financial Crisis, FIN. 
SERVS. OUTLOOK Jan.–Feb. 2011, available at http://www.aei.org/files/2011/02/10/FSO-
2011-02-g.pdf. 
4 Id. at 3–4 (noting the deterioration of mortgage underwriting standards in the years 
prior to the bubble’s collapse). 
5 Carlos Garriga, Lending Standards in Mortgage Market, ECON. SYNOPSES, May 6, 
2009, at 1, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/09/ES0923.pdf 
(describing the loose lending standards through statistics). 
6 See generally FABOZZI & KOTHARI, supra note 1, at 306–10 (explaining the concept of 
protection buying and selling). 
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I am not claiming that the protection gap is unique to complex 
financing transactions.  However, I believe that it is an order of magnitude 
larger than the gap in traditional financings.7 
The National Century Financial Enterprises (NCFE) bankruptcy 
litigation provides an example of a protection gap in monitoring.8  NCFE 
fraudulently misused collections on the securitized assets, causing more 
than $2.6 billion of asset-backed securities to default.9  The investors sued 
the trustee (among others), alleging failure to adequately monitor.10  Prior 
to becoming aware of a default, however, the trustee’s job is purely 
ministerial.11  Given the amount of money involved, it is unclear why the 
investors themselves did not also engage in monitoring. 
Other securitization-transaction disputes concern protection gaps in 
documentation.  For example, in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. 
Victoria Finance Ltd.,12 the parties alleged that the transaction documents 
failed to explain how the waterfall of payments would be allocated after 
default.13  In Luminent Mortgage Capital, Inc. v. HSBC Securities (USA) 
Inc.,14 the complaint alleged that the transaction documents did not 
adequately specify when the lender could collect bonds posted as 
collateral.15  In HSH Nordbank AG v. UBS AG,16 the complaint alleged that 
the transaction documents lacked clarity in establishing UBS’s level of 
responsibility for monitoring the credit quality of the securitization 
assets.17 
                                                                                                                          
7 See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
8 In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enter., Inc., No. 2:03-md-1565, 2006 WL 2849784, at *2 
(S.D. Ohio 2006). 
9 Id. at *1. 
10 Id. at *2 (alleging causes of action against the trustee that included breach of contract 
and breach of fiduciary duty). 
11 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a) (2006).  See also Elliott Assocs. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank & 
Trust Co., 838 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1988). 
12 No. 600071-08, 2008 WL 4263259, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2008). 
13 Interpleader Complaint at 12–16, Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Victoria Fin. 
Ltd., No. 600071-08, 2008 WL 4263259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2008). 
14 No. 07-CV-9340 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 18, 2007). 
15 Complaint at 2, 6, Luminent Mortg. Capital, Inc. v. HSBC Secs. (USA) Inc., No. 07-
CV-9340 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 18, 2007). 
16 No. 600562/08, 2012 WL 997166, at *1–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2008).   
17 Id.  See also Complaint at 22–23, HSH Nordbank, AG v. UBS AG, No. 600562/08, 
2012 WL 997166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2008). 
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I will attempt to explain why this protection gap exists in securitization 
transactions.  First, however, securitization must be explained. 
B. Securitization 
Securitization refers to a category of financing transactions in which 
companies sell income-producing financial assets (such as mortgage loans, 
accounts receivable, and lease rentals) to a trust or other special-purpose 
entity (SPE), sometimes interchangeably called a special-purpose vehicle 
(SPV).18  This SPE finances its purchases by directly or indirectly selling 
securities backed by rights to payments from these assets to investors.19  
The investors look to the SPE and its purchased financial assets for 
repayment. 
Companies engaging in securitization transactions are called 
“originators,” to distinguish them from the SPE companies.20  Securities of 
an SPE that are paid, or “backed,” from collections on mortgage loans are 
called “mortgage-backed securities” (MBS).21  Securities of an SPE that 
are paid from collections on other types of financial assets are called 
“asset-backed securities” (ABS).22  Sometimes even MBS are referred to as 
ABS, the more inclusive category (mortgage loans being a type of asset). 
Securitization is an important source of low-cost corporate financing23 
as well as a critical means by which banks and other lenders turn their 
                                                                                                                          
18 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L. BUS. 
& FIN. 133, 135 (1994). 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 
1540 (2004).  To persuade investors to accept risk on an SPE’s securities, the originator 
generally takes the first risk of loss on the underlying financial assets.  It normally does this 
through “overcollateralization” effectively transferring to the SPE financial assets 
marginally in excess of the minimum amount needed to repay the securities issued by the 
SPE.  FABOZZI & KOTHARI, supra note 1, at 89–90; Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use 
and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 
1316 n.38 (2002). 
21 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 
1, 6 (2011). 
22 See Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 144. 
23 Id. at 135.  By not having to borrow from a bank (or other intermediary of funds), a 
corporate originator avoids the bank’s profit mark-up.  See Schwarcz, Securitization Post-
Enron, supra note 20, at 1551.  This “disintermediation” is not dissimilar to buying 
wholesale instead of paying the retail price.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, 
(continued) 
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financial assets into cash, thereby enabling them to continue making loans.  
Securitization also helps to lower the cost of loans made to consumers.24  
By 1992, securitization had become so important to the American 
economy that the Securities and Exchange Commission observed that it 
was “becoming one of the dominant means of capital formation in the 
United States.”25  The growth of securitization continued throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, rising to $11.8 trillion in 2008.26  During the 2008 
financial crisis, the federal government initiated a $200 billion Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) to keep the securitization markets 
running, thereby assuring “the availability of credit to households and 
businesses of all sizes.”27 
                                                                                                                          
Disintermediating Aravice: A Legal Framework for Commercially Sustainable 
Microfinance, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2011).  Securitization also accomplishes a 
cost saving by allocating risk to parties with special securitization expertise and experience, 
who are thereby better able to understand and assess risks associated with securitization 
transactions.  STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ASSET SECURITIZATION § 1:3 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that except for the most highly rated 
issuers, securities issued in securitization transactions typically are more highly rated than 
the issuer’s own debt securities—and that, even where the latter are more highly rated, 
securitization provides additional market flexibility to obtain financing). 
24 Cf. Patric H. Hendershott & James D. Shilling, The Impact of the Agencies on 
Conventional Fixed-Rate Mortgage Yields, 2 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 101 (1989) 
(finding that securitization of conforming fixed-rate mortgage loans significantly lowered 
interest rates on mortgage loans relative to what they would otherwise have been); C.F. 
Sirmans & John D. Benjamin, Pricing Fixed Rate Mortgages: Some Empirical Evidence, 4 
J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 191 (1990) (finding significantly lower interest rates on fixed-rate 
mortgages that can be sold in the secondary market versus those that cannot, thereby 
indicating the value of the ability to securitize mortgages). 
25 Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured Financings, 57 
Fed. Reg. 56,248 (Nov. 27, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).  
26 The State of Securitization Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Secs., Ins., & 
Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 33 (2011) 
(prepared statement of Steven L. Schwarcz).  
27 See, e.g., Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: Frequently Asked Questions, 
FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (July 21, 2010), http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/talf_faq.html; 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) Terms and Conditions, FED. RESERVE, 
1 (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/monetary 
20081125a1.pdf. 
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Securitization transactions are inherently complex insofar as they have 
many different steps and many parties who participate at different stages.  
From the standpoint of originator-risk assessment, however, they can be 
less complex than ordinary lending.  This is because in a properly 
structured securitization, the sale of the financial assets to the SPE 
separates payment risk from the risks generally associated with the 
originator, including the risk of originator default.  This is referred to as 
achieving “bankruptcy remoteness.”28  Bankruptcy remoteness can reduce 
asymmetric information by enabling the investors to focus on risks 
specifically associated with well-defined and well-diversified financial 
assets.29 
Certain types of securitization transactions can inadvertently cause 
information failure, or at least make it difficult for investors and other 
parties to understand risks associated with the transferred financial assets.  
This occurs in securitizations of ABS and MBS already issued in prior 
securitization transactions—effectively securitizations of securitizations—
where the resulting securities are issued in multiple layers of different 
priorities.30  In these more complex transactions, relatively small errors in 
cash-flow projections can have dramatic consequences. 
For example, at least one cause of the 2008 financial crisis was that 
relatively small errors in cash-flow projections (resulting from 
unexpectedly high default rates due to initially declining housing prices on 
subprime mortgage loans underlying a portion of the MBS supporting 
these complex transactions) created defaults and ratings downgrades on 
substantial amounts of securities issued in these transactions.31  The 
                                                                                                                          
28 See, e.g., Thomas J. Gordon, Securitization of Executory Future Flows as 
Bankruptcy-Remote True Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2000).  
29 See, e.g., Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and 
Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 55, 66–67 (2011).  Information asymmetry refers to a 
situation in which one party has more information than another regarding, for example, the 
quality or risk of an asset.  See id. at 94 (explaining the asymmetries that have arisen from 
“the modern financial innovation process”). 
30 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 211, 220 (2009). 
31 Cf. Joshua Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 
(2009) (finding that complex securitization transactions such as collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) “amplifie[d] errors in evaluating the risk of the underlying securities”).  
See David Milliken & Richard Barley, ABS CDOs, at Heart of Crisis, May Disappear, 
REUTERS NEWS (Apr. 1, 2008, 1:37 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/04/01/bis-
(continued) 
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defaults and ratings downgrades occurred even before the financial crisis 
itself began to cause massive job losses and a spiraling collapse of the 
housing market. 
III. HYPOTHESES AND TRANSACTION PARTIES  
Several interrelated reasons can help to explain the existence of the 
protection gap.  Securitization transactions involve an extraordinary 
multitude of transaction parties, which can make it unusually difficult to 
coordinate or allocate responsibility among them.32  The multitude of 
parties might also mislead some parties into thinking that other parties will 
protect their interests, leading to overreliance.  Therefore, one hypothesis 
for the protection gap is that the multitude of parties creates collective 
action problems. 
Some securitization transactions, especially securitizations of 
securitizations, are also extremely complex, in both their design and 
documentation.33  The structured nature of these transactions—including 
their many different steps and the different parties who participate at each 
step—also introduces novel elements that are atypical in ordinary 
financing, such as lending.  By making it difficult to comprehend the 
transaction as an entirety, these complexities and novelties create 
uncertainty, causing parties to over-focus on relatively simple and 
straightforward elements, such as the underlying financial assets (e.g., 
mortgage loans), and to under-focus on less certain elements, such as the 
structure and the documentation.34  This suggests another hypothesis for 
                                                                                                                          
assetbackedsecurities-idUKL0161391420080401 (“The use of credit derivatives in fact 
allowed more exposure to be created than the amount of underlying bonds issued.”).  See 
also David Reilly, Center of a Storm: How CDOs Work, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2007), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118255822369045404.html (“CDOs have generated debate 
because they are complex, and pose a risk because they are several steps removed from the 
actual asset, or debt, that is being packaged.”). 
32 Cf. Gretchen Morgenson, Get Ready, Get Set, Point Fingers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2009, at B1 (asking who should be responsible in a failed MBS transaction). 
33 Schwarcz, supra note 30, at 220. 
34 Indeed, there may be rational ignorance in parties not understanding everything.  Cf. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. 
REV. 1109, 1113–15 (2008) (arguing that the cost of fully understanding disclosure may 
appear ex ante to exceed its benefits); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure 
Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2004). 
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the existence of the protection gap—the complexity and novelty of 
securitization transactions undermine analysis. 
Even traditional financing transactions can, to some extent, have 
protection gaps.  Companies with ongoing business relationships typically 
operate based on mutual trust established through long-standing repeated 
contacts between the companies.35  Trust plays a crucial role in creating 
and managing inter-company alliances because it “reduces complex 
realities far more quickly and economically than prediction, authority, or 
bargaining.”36  It therefore is common for transaction parties to assume the 
good faith of other transaction parties.  Similarly, even in traditional 
financing transactions, it may be impossible to anticipate, and therefore 
contractually protect against, every possibility.37  Securitization 
transactions, however, can multiply the protection gap because they have 
many more parties, often with complex interrelationships, and much more 
complex and novel documentation and structures.  
A. Transaction Parties  
In general, the transaction parties in a securitization transaction include 
the originator, the SPE (sometimes multiple SPEs), underwriters, multiple 
classes (or tranches) of investors having different payment priorities, rating 
agencies, trustees, servicers, and professionals such as lawyers and 
accountants.  Sometimes additional parties, such as monoline insurance 
companies, act as credit enhancers.  I will not treat monoline insurance 
companies as separate parties, however, because from a risk-analysis 
standpoint, they are effectively lower priority, or “subordinated,” investors. 
Underwriters help the SPE issue its securities by marketing the 
securities to potential investors.38  Under the federal securities laws, they 
                                                                                                                          
35 Thierry Volery & Stan Mensik, The Role of Trust in Creating Effective Alliances: A 
Managerial Perspective, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 987, 987–92 (1998). 
36 Id. at 993.  There is a significant literature on relational contracting, in which parties 
with ongoing business relationships deal on the basis of trust.  See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & 
Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. 
POL. ECON. 615 (1981); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 
(1980). 
37 Volery & Mensik, supra note 35, at 988–89. 
38 Katina J. Dorton, Auctioning New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REV. 
1381, 1381–82 (1985).  Underwriters are paid fees for their services.  Id.  For example, an 
underwriter may earn a spread equal to the difference between the amount paid to the issuer 
of the securities and the offering price to investors, net of expenses incurred. 
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must provide investors in public deals with detailed information regarding 
the issued securities39 (usually included in a prospectus or a supplement 
thereto).  However, most securities are issued by SPEs in private 
placements.40 
Investors are typically large, sophisticated financial institutions, such 
as banks, pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds.41  Investors 
choose the priority level of the securities they purchase.42  The most senior 
priority securities are paid first; more subordinated priority securities are 
paid thereafter, and thus are the first to absorb losses on the underlying 
financial assets.43  This makes the senior securities less risky than the 
average risk on the SPE’s financial assets because collections on all those 
assets, even collections intended to otherwise support payment of 
subordinated priority securities, are dedicated first to assure payment of the 
senior securities.44  This so-called “senior-subordinated” structure enables 
an SPE to sell very highly rated senior securities to investors who demand 
a relatively risk-free financial product. 
Rating agencies are private companies, such as Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) and Moody’s, and provide credit ratings for debt securities, 
including MBS and ABS.45  A rating reflects their assessment of the 
likelihood of timely payment of interest and return of principal to 
investors.46  Rating agencies assert that they merely express an opinion, 
                                                                                                                          
39 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1988) 
(imposing duty to file periodic reports); Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1988) 
(imposing duty to make disclosures in connection with sale of securities). 
40 Edward T. McDermott, The Private Offering Exemption, 59 IOWA L. REV. 525, 525–
26 (1973–1974). 
41 K INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE PUBLICATIONS, INC., MORTGAGE-RELATED SECURITIES 
HOLDINGS BY INVESTOR (The Mortgage Market Statistical Annual–Vol. II CD-ROM, rel. 
2010). 
42 Joel Telpner, A Securitisation Primer for First Time Issuers, in GLOBAL 
SECURITIZATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 6 (Greenberg Traurig ed., 2003), available at 
http://www2.gtlaw.com/pub/articles/2003/telpner03a.pdf. 
43 Id.  
44 Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime 
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 378 (2008).  
45 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency 
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2002).  
46 See generally id.  The highest rating on long-term debt securities is AAA, with 
ratings descending to AA, then to A, and then to BBB and below.  Id. at 7.  The higher the 
(continued) 
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which they maintain is First Amendment protected speech, and that they do 
not take on transactional responsibility. 
Trustees have a bifurcated role in securitization transactions.  Prior to a 
default, the trustee’s role is largely ministerial,47 including holding security 
for investors, monitoring covenant compliance, making payments, 
investing idle assets, monitoring the servicer’s collections, and 
administering the underlying financial assets.48  After default, however, a 
trustee must act as a prudent person in the best interests of the investors.49 
Servicers act on behalf of the SPE to collect the payments from the 
underlying financial assets.  To this end, a servicer performs administrative 
duties that typically include mailing billing statements, collecting 
payments, and supervising delinquent financial assets, such as engaging in 
debt workout and foreclosure proceedings.50  The originator itself or an 
affiliate of the originator, being familiar with and having procedures in 
place to monitor and collect payment on the financial assets, often acts as 
the servicer for a fee.51 
Professionals include accountants and lawyers, encompassing both 
outside and in-house counsel.  The client, often acting through in-house 
counsel, sets the scope of work of outside counsel.52  However, in-house 
counsel may have a broader, perhaps more proactive, responsibility to the 
                                                                                                                          
rating, the lower the credit risk associated with the securities in question as determined by 
the rating agency.  Id.  Ratings below BBB are deemed non-investment grade (or “junk,” as 
in junk bonds) and indicate that full and timely repayment on the securities may be 
speculative.  See, e.g., Credit Ratings Definitions & FAQs, STANDARD & POOR’S, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us#def_1 (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2011). 
47 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a) (2006).  See also Elliott Assocs. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank & 
Trust Co., 838 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1988). 
48 Christopher J. Brady et al., The Role of the Trustee in Securitization Transactions, in 
SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS 9–3 (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
49 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (2006).  See also Susan J. Macaulay, US: The Role of the 
Securitisation Trustee, in GLOBAL SECURITISATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE (Gardner 
Carton & Douglas LLP ed., 2004) (noting these duties may include enforcing remedies, 
serving as backup servicer, and taking action in bankruptcy). 
50 FABOZZI & KOTHARI, supra note 1, at 124–28. 
51 SCHWARCZ, supra note 23, § 4:5, at 4–10; ANDREW DAVIDSON ET AL., 
SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 521–22 (2003). 
52 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005). 
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client.53  In-house counsel are particularly well-situated to serve 
anticipatory and preventative functions for their business clients.54  They 
are usually present and can offer legal advice early in the decision-making 
process.55  Because they only serve a single client,56 in-house counsel 
benefit from superior information about that client’s organization, 
operations, and business culture.57 
Accountants act on behalf of the originator to decide how the 
securitization transaction should be treated (or “booked”) for accounting 
purposes in the originator’s financial statements.  The primary question is 
whether to book the transaction as a sale of the financial assets or, instead, 
as a loan secured by the financial assets.58  In answering this question, the 
accountant’s duty is to act fairly and objectively.59 
IV. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES  
Although the scope of this article does not permit a full proof, let us 
begin to test the hypotheses for the protection gap in securitization 
                                                                                                                          
53 See Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully & Steven L. Schwarcz, In-House Counsel’s 
Role in the Structuring of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 521 (2012). 
54 See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 195 (2006) (“[T]he inside counsel is uniquely positioned to specialize in 
preventive law.”); Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite 
Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 280–81 (1985) (“The general counsel, as a part of senior 
management . . . has both the right and responsibility to insist upon early legal involvement 
in major transactions that will raise significant legal issues.”); Richard S. Gruner, Corporate 
Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 
1113, 1116 (1997) (“[T]oday’s general counsel is much more concerned with forward-
looking, systematic features of corporate law compliance.”); Robert E. Rosen, The Inside 
Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 
479, 519 (1989) (“As in the management of outside counsel, in preventive law practice, 
corporations rely on inside counsel to implement and determine corporate interests.”); 
Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House 
Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 115 (2011) (explaining that in-house counsel 
possesses traits “essential to practicing strategic preventive law”). 
55 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 54, at 281; Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 54, at 113. 
56 Albeit a complex client, generally speaking.  Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 54, at 
111.  
57 Id. at 113–14. 
58 Schwarcz, supra note 52, at 2. 
59 Id. at 27. 
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transactions—that the multitude of parties creates collective action 
problems, and that the complexity and novelty of the transactions 
undermine analysis.  In preparation, we must first distinguish the 
protection gap from larger issues of financial failure. 
In other research, I have explored those larger issues, including the 
problem of systemic risk.60  I have argued that financial failure should be 
addressed within an overall conceptual framework, which I call the “3Cs-
and-TOC.”61  This is comprised of four types of market imperfections: (1) 
conflicts of interest;62 (2) complacency of investors and other market 
participants; (3) complexity of financial markets and of the securities 
traded therein; and (4) a type of tragedy-of-the-commons (TOC) collective 
action problem in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources 
accrue to individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to 
maximize use of the resources, whereas the costs of exploitation, which 
affect the real economy, are distributed among an even wider class of 
persons.63 
The 3Cs-and-TOC framework can help to inform an understanding of 
the protection gap in securitization transactions.  Complexity is itself part 
of one of the hypotheses for the protection gap.  Complacency contributes 
to creating the gap, and conflicts and the TOC almost certainly exacerbate 
it.  Because the protection gap ties to a particular type of financial 
                                                                                                                          
60 For an introduction, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & 
Bus., Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Keynote Address at the European Central Bank Seminar on 
Regulation of Financial Services in the EU: Surveillance—Resilience—Transparency: A 
Regulatory Framework for Managing Systemic Risk (Oct. 20, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2459). 
61 See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards 
an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1362–70, 1375–76 (2011). 
62 For example, I have examined the existence of secondary management conflicts, in 
which the investors’ analysts recommend deals based on ratings and the like without 
adequate further inquiry.  See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial 
Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 
(2009). 
63 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200 (2008).  I recently refined 
this conceptual framework in a speech at a European Central Bank conference.  See 
Schwarcz, supra note 60.  
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transaction (i.e., securitization) and because it has consequences that may 
not be systemic, it is a subset of financial failure.64 
A. Hypothesis: The Multitude of Parties in Securitization Transactions 
Creates Collective Action Problems 
One scholar has recently developed a multitude-of-parties type of 
argument to broadly explain financial transaction failures, arguing they 
result from a “multiple gatekeeper phenomenon.”65  Because of the 
multitude of professionals involved in complex financial transactions 
(Tuch focuses on outside law firms66), professionals individually have an 
incentive to minimize their role.67 
Focusing on collective action problems of professionals, however, 
ignores the essential fact that professionals are merely agents of the 
principals—usually the underwriters and investors.  The real question 
should be why the principals who actually suffer losses—such as 
investors—do not adequately protect themselves.68 
To some extent, the answer may be that the multitude of investors can 
mean that no individual investor has enough at risk to engage in sufficient 
                                                                                                                          
64 The protection gap also represents more of a tactical failure—the failure of 
transaction parties to design appropriate documentation and monitoring protections. 
65 Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1585 (2010) 
(introducing the term “multiple gatekeeper phenomenon”). 
66 Tuch’s article does not address why in-house counsel do not fill the gap left by 
outside counsel, as legal gatekeepers.  See generally Barnes, Cully & Schwarcz, supra note 
53 (discussing the role of in-house counsel as gatekeepers in securitization transactions). 
67 Tuch, supra note 65, at 1603.  See also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1166–72, 1231–32, 1246–48 (2005) (discussing lawyers hiding in 
the shadows of the divisions of responsibility); Bevis Longstreth, Corporate Law: Problems 
in the Corporate Bar (as It Appears to a Retired Practitioner), MONT. LAW., Feb. 2006, at 
22–23 (discussing practitioners’ tendency to narrow their vision to “avoid the difficulty of 
having to say ‘no’” to a client). 
68 Tuch also argues that the multiple-gatekeeper phenomenon allows clients to position 
themselves between gatekeepers so that no party has complete knowledge of transactions.  
See Tuch, supra note 65, at 1603–04 (discussing the merger of Bank of America and 
Merrill Lynch as an illustration of this concern).  Although this argument incongruously 
assumes that the clients themselves wish for court failure, it might have some explanatory 
power in a fraud. 
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due diligence—a problem “akin to a tragedy of the anticommons.”69  
Another answer may be that the multitude of parties misleads investors 
into thinking that other parties will protect their interests, causing 
overreliance.  Consider how that latter answer may play out with the 
example of overreliance on trustees. 
There certainly appears to be overreliance on trustees.  Because 
securitization transactions are essentially financings,70 the trustee in these 
transactions is not a traditional fiduciary trustee, but rather an indenture 
trustee or a collateral trustee.71  This type of trustee “is more like a 
stakeholder whose duties and obligations are exclusively defined by the 
terms of the indenture agreement.”72 
In accord with this stakeholder nature, the trustee’s legal duties are, at 
least prior to a default, ministerial.73  The American Bankers Association 
has also observed that trustees—who receive low fees74 and usually are late 
additions to a securitization transaction, with little opportunity to negotiate 
their position75—view themselves as having little substantive oversight and 
no duties to make independent investigations to detect default, fraud, or 
                                                                                                                          
69 Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 517 (2012). 
70 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling 
the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 569–70 (2003) (discussing trust indentures used in 
financing transactions and the nature of the “hybrid form of a trust” created by such 
indentures). 
71 See generally In re Med. Capital Sec. Litig., No. SAML 10–2145 DOC, 2011 WL 
5067208, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2011) (discussing the differences between these types of 
trustees and traditional fiduciary trustees). 
72 Meckel v. Cont’l Res. Co., 758 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1985). 
73 See Macaulay, supra note 49; Levitin & Twomey, supra note 21, at 58–63 (noting 
that residential mortgage-backed securities trustees are “passive ministerial entities and 
financial backstops”). 
74 See, e.g., Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch: Seller/Servicer Risk Trumps Trustee’s 
Role in U.S. ABS Transactions (Feb. 24, 2003), available at http://www.securitization.net/ 
pdf/fitch_risk_022403.pdf (“The trustee’s role in ABS transactions has clearly been 
marginalized over time due to a combination of fear of liability and low fees.”). 
75 AM. BANKERS ASS’N, CORPORATE TRUST COMMITTEE, THE TRUSTEE’S ROLE IN ASSET-
BACKED SECURITIES 4 (Mar. 12, 3003), available at http://findsenlaw.files. 
wordpress.com/2010/11/11-12-10-aba-trustee-whitepaper1.pdf (suggesting that the 
Corporate Trust Committee’s report represented the views of “virtually all trustees for 
asset-backed securities”). 
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breach of transaction documents.76  Moreover, trustees are often ill-
equipped to fill gaps in securitization transactions because they do not have 
the expertise to make substantive business decisions, especially when the 
language in the documentation is vague or ambiguous.77 
Transaction parties, however, often have highly divergent views of the 
role of the trustee, sometimes viewing the trustee as a crucial figure in 
complex financial transactions.78  This can lead to overreliance.  For 
example, prominent rating agency Moody’s has stated that trustees “have 
argued that their conduct is subject to the ‘prudent person’ standard of care 
only after a transaction has defaulted.”79  Yet, in “the majority of cases, and 
especially transactions involving unrated or noninvestment-grade-rated 
seller/servicers, this was not Moody’s understanding of the trustee’s role 
when these transactions were initially rated.”80  Moody’s has even 
suggested that trustee performance falls short of expectations in monitoring 
cash flows, taking action when evidence of improprieties arise, assuming 
backup servicing duties, and noting covenant breaches.81 
The litigation surrounding the bankruptcy of NCFE exemplifies how 
overreliance on trustees can cause a protection gap.82  Recall that the 
investors alleged a wide range of causes of action against the trustee, 
including failure to adequately monitor.83  The court, however, dismissed 
all claims except those founded on express provisions of the transaction 
documents, accepting the trustee’s narrow conception of its duties.84  The 
                                                                                                                          
76 Id. at 6.  
77 Id. at 11. 
78 In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., No. 2:03-md-1565, 2006 WL 2849784, at *2 
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2006). 
79 Claire M. Robinson, Moody’s Re-Examines Trustees’ Role in ABS and RMBS, in 
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE: STRUCTURED FINANCE 1, 2 (Feb. 4, 2003). 
80 Id. at 1 (noting the trustee’s “key role” in securitization transactions). 
81 Id. at 2. 
82 See supra text accompanying notes 8–11 (discussing that litigation).  NCFE provided 
health care receivable financing by wholly-owned SPEs offering bonds backed by the 
receivables.  Suffering from shortages of cash, NCFE transferred funds between reserve 
accounts.  NCFE’s indiscretions eventually led to bankruptcy and a deluge of litigation.  
Brady et al., supra note 48, at 9–3. 
83 See supra text accompanying note 20. 
84 In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., No. 2:03-md-1565, 2006 WL 2849784, at *2 
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2006) (“The Master Indenture created a narrow role for the Trustees, 
(continued) 
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investors therefore relied (or, at least, claimed they relied) on the trustee to 
perform monitoring duties that the trustee legally had no obligation to (and 
therefore did not) perform.   
An unanswered question is the extent to which the public nature of 
these litigations is resolving—and are likely to resolve—overreliance on 
trustees. 
B. Hypothesis: The Complexity and Novelty of Securitization Transactions 
Undermine Analysis 
In this hypothesis, complexity and novelty create uncertainty, which 
undermines analysis.  The greater the complexity and novelty, the harder 
something is to understand and the less certain we are about it.  We then 
focus on the simpler and more straightforward elements with which we are 
familiar.  In a complex and unusual MBS transaction, for example, we may 
focus on the fact that the transaction is supported by mortgage loans, 
missing key elements of the transaction’s structure. 
The notion that uncertainty undermines analysis is fairly well-
established.  In behavioral psychology, for example, uncertainty can cause 
people to view actual and certain costs as more important than uncertain 
future costs, even though the latter, if they occur, may be huge.85  This 
might help explain why even sophisticated institutional investors viewed 
the relatively high interest rates on MBS as more important than possible 
future risk on those securities. 
Uncertainty can also reduce the perception of responsibility.  For 
example, uncertainty enables soldiers in firing squads to choose to believe 
they did not fire the kill shot.86  Perhaps this also helps explain why 
investors did not govern their investments by the same strict lending 
standards they would observe but for the separation of origination and 
ownership.87 
Uncertainty also causes people to believe what they want to believe.  It 
is reported that King Croesus of Lydia wanted to make war on Cyrus, but 
was wary of doing so without heavenly sanction.  After singling out the 
Delphic Oracle as the most reliable, the King’s messengers “asked the 
                                                                                                                          
who undertook to perform ‘only such duties as are specifically set forth in [the] Master 
Indenture.’”). 
85 Cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 61. 
86 David Usborne, Firing Squad Prepare for Grisly Duty, N.Z. HERALD NEWS, June 15, 
2010, at 2. 
87 See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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practical question about the advisability of Croesus’ going to war, and 
received the famous [and famously ambiguous] response that ‘Croesus by 
crossing the Halys would destroy a mighty kingdom.’”88  Croesus 
interpreted this to mean what he wanted to hear—that Cyrus would fall—
but in fact the empire that fell was his own.89  This may help to explain 
why investors were prepared to believe that the AAA-rated and other 
investment-grade rated securities issued in securitization transactions 
(offering much higher returns than other similarly rated securities), 
represented good investments even though they were at least partly backed 
by subprime mortgages. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has explored a conundrum that I call the “protection gap.”  
In complex securitization transactions, parties may be unable or unwilling 
to pay the price for full protection.  As a result, they may choose or are 
forced to assume the good faith of the other parties to the transaction and 
the consistency and completeness of protections provided in the transaction 
documents.   
The article identifies, and also tests, several interrelated hypotheses for 
the protection gap.  One hypothesis is that the multitude of parties in 
securitization transactions creates collective action problems.  Another 
hypothesis is that the complexity and novelty of securitization transactions 
undermine analysis.  
Even traditional financing transactions can, to some extent, have 
protection gaps.  The article argues, however, that securitization 
transactions can multiply the protection gap because they have many more 
parties, often with complex interrelationships, and much more complex 
and novel documentation and structures. 
                                                                                                                          
88 REV. T. DEMPSEY, THE DELPHIC ORACLE: ITS EARLY HISTORY, INFLUENCE, AND FALL 
70 (1972). 
89 Id. at 71, 107 (discussing the historical method of the oracles as sheltering ignorance 
behind a “studied ambiguity” and vagueness).  This same method of response is said also to 
be used today by fortune tellers.  See J. Barkley Rosser Jr., Alternative Keynesian and Post 
Keynesian Perspectives on Uncertainty and Expectations, 23 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 
545, 554–57 (2001) (arguing that uncertainty leads to self-fulfilling mistakes). 
